DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 311 481 CS 506 718

AUTHOR Caudill, Susan
TITLE Publicity as an Instrument of Reform.
PUB DATE Aug 89
NOTE 34p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (72nd, Washington, DC, August 10-13, 1989).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Historical Materials (060) -- Information Analyses (070)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Disarmament; Mass Media Role; Media Research; Models; Nuclear Warfare; Peace; *Publicity; Public Relations; World Problems
IDENTIFIERS Einstein (Albert); *Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists; *Reform Efforts; Thematic Analysis

ABSTRACT

Albert Einstein and the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists (ECAS) conducted a reform-based public communication campaign for the international control of atomic energy after the Second World War. The Committee raised funds and sought publicity for its proposed solution to the problem of war and the management of peace. Its solution was the institution of a supra-national or world government with more comprehensive powers than those of the United Nations. Submission to a world government would require disarmament and giving up "the secret" of the atom bomb. This was a radical proposal in light of the growing tensions of the Cold War and America's overwhelming concern with national security in what it perceived as a hostile world. A thematic analysis of the Committee's campaign literature indicated that the ECAS relied on fear and had reform as the primary goal, even though the Committee's incorporation papers stated that it had an educational mission. Analysis of the Committee's campaign also indicated that it cannot be easily classified under James Grunig's four models of public relations and suggests that publicity as an instrument of reform may be conceptually distinct from press agentry and public information. (Fifty-nine notes are included.) (Author/RS)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED311481

"Publicity As An Instrument of Reform"

by Susan Caudill, doctoral candidate, College of Communications, the University of Tennessee at Knoxville.
Presented to the Public Relations Division of AEJMC, Washington, D.C., August 1989.

ABSTRACT

Albert Einstein and the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists conducted a reform-based public communication campaign for the international control of atomic energy after World War II. The Committee raised funds and sought publicity for its proposed solution to the problem of war and the management of peace. Its solution was the institution of a supra-national or world government with more comprehensive powers than those of the United Nations. Submission to a world government would require disarmament and giving up "the secret" of the atom bomb. Obviously, this was a radical proposal in light of the growing tensions of the Cold War and America's overwhelming concern with national security in what it perceived as a hostile world. A thematic analysis of the Committee's campaign literature indicates that the ECAS relied extensively on a fear appeal and had reform as a primary goal, even though its incorporation papers stated that the Committee had an educational mission. Analysis of the ECAS campaign also indicates that it cannot be easily classified under Grunig's four models of public relations and suggests that publicity as an instrument of reform may be conceptually distinct from press agentry and public information.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CS506718

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Susan Caudill

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

Studies of the Manhattan Project, the atomic scientists' movement as a political phenomenon and the competing influences on American atomic energy policy, are numerous. However, there has been little research that has focused exclusively on atomic scientists' use of publicity to educate the public about the socio-political and international impact of the release of atomic energy.1

Atomic scientists after World War II, seeking to capitalize on the extraordinary atmosphere of shock generated by the bomb, joined other participants in the American peace movement in calling for an end to war. The search for peace has always been the archetypical Progressive reform, and so scientists, alarmed by the tremendously destructive power of the bomb they built, joined with other prominent citizens who sought to end war by campaigning for the international control of atomic energy.2 International control meant different things to different groups of people, including scientists, but in the main it meant two things: international control through an expanded United Nations or international control through a supra-national

---

1 See for example Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and A Hope, The Scientists' Movement in America: 1945-47. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965; Donald A. Strickland, The Atomic Scientists Movement, 1945-46, Purdue Research Foundation, 1968; William Maxfield Alexander, "Influences of the Atomic Scientists on the Enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," PhD dissertation, June 1963, University of Oregon, Department of Political Science.

2 Lawrence S. Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969; Harold Josephson, "Albert Einstein: The Search for World Order," in Peace Heroes in Twentieth Century America, ed., Charles DeBenedetti, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1986; Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American History, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1980.

structure with the power to control atomic energy development and to keep the peace. The latter meant that nations would have to disarm and surrender military control to a supra-national government.

This paper focuses on the fundraising and publicity campaign conducted by the the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists (ECAS) led by this century's most famous scientist, Albert Einstein. Einstein had been since 1914 one of the most visible scientists in Europe, and especially after 1929, in America. By 1946, Einstein already had participated in two major fundraising events and had spoken out on a range of controversial issues. In fact, he fits Goodell's criteria for the "visible scientist," who uses all available media to gain acceptance for an issue that usually is outside the scientist's area of expertise.3

Einstein was asked to head the ECAS because of the drawing power of his name, according to Harold L. Oram, a New York City fundraiser and public relations consultant who had been retained to guide the ECAS campaign. Oram had known Einstein since 1940, when the two had worked on the Emergency Rescue Committee fund drive. The ECAS's fundraising letters went out over Einstein's signature, although the content of the letters had to be approved by the Committee. Decisions about which pamphlet to include in the mailing also were made by the Committee.4

---

3 Rae Goodell, The Visible Scientists, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

4 "Rough Notations of Discussion at Trustee's Meeting, Nov. 14, 1947," Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists Archives, Joseph Regenstein Library, the University of Chicago, Box 3, File 26.

This paper argues that ECAS members made conscious and controlled use of publicity as an instrument of reform to advance the idea that a world government distinct from the United Nations was the only possible solution to survival in the atomic age. This paper also argues that the ECAS's public communication campaign cannot be properly categorized under Grunig's four models of public relations.

A thematic analysis of the ECAS campaign literature, including pamphlets, appeal letters, and campaign memos, was done. These items also were examined to determine how well their content meshed with the stated aims of the campaign at the time of the Committee's incorporation. Mass media publicity statements, which for the Committee were essays published in Atlantic, Harper's, The Nation, The New York Times Magazine, Science, the Christian Century, the New Republic, the Saturday Review and several other specialized circulation journals, were examined for predominant themes and types of appeal.5 The Committee's mass media messages were located by the name of each committee member who wrote an article about atomic energy or science for media indexed in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature between 1946 and 1951.

Hereafter, the notation will be ECAS papers. See also Schaffner to ECAS, "Analysis by the Executive Director," April 30, 1947, Box 4, F. 6; Oram to ECAS, "Memorandum on Fund Raising Campaign for the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, Inc., Aug. 27, 1946, p. 3; Oram to Schaffner, "Memorandum to the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, Inc.," Oct. 1, 1946, Box 5, F.7., and Fry to Urey, April 21, 1948, Box 5, F.8; Minett to Oram, "Memorandum on ECAS Fund-raising," Nov. 14, 1947, Box 3, F. 26.

5 Ethos, pathos, logos and fear appeals were examined according to William J. McGuire's typology in "Message Factors," The Handbook of Social Psychology," eds., Gardner Lindsey and Elliot Aronson, 2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 200-214.

The ECAS made conscious and controlled use of publicity in its reform campaign for the international control of atomic energy. The ECAS advocated a more radical form of world government than the United Nations. World government, these scientists reasoned, would eliminate war and prevent the misuse of atomic energy. Such an international arrangement also would permit a greater role for scientists. Manhattan Project scientist and ECAS member Harold C. Urey envisioned:6

> . . . an eventual meeting of the leaders of the great powers in company with their scientists. I know that scientific advisers would reflect the good faith of their leaders. Scientists will have no trouble understanding one another.

BACKGROUND

The usual list of reasons for scientific activism in the immediate post-World War II years are the following: guilt over having developed a weapon of terribly destructive force; resentment because the government did not offer Japan a "test demonstration" or at least a warning before the atom bombs were dropped; increasing hostility toward the military for its strict enforcement of secrecy regulations during the Manhattan Project; the desire to thwart further military control over the development of atomic energy; resentment by rank-and-file scientists on the Manhattan Project against the wartime scientific leaders for their support of legislation deemed inimical to the interests of nuclear physics.7

---

6 Harold C. Urey, as told to Michael Amrine, "I'm A Frightened Man," Collier's 117:51, Jan. 5, 1946.

7 In addition to Smith and Strickland, see Michael Amrine, The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959, and Ronald W. Clark, The Greatest Power on Earth:

All of these reasons are firmly grounded in solid historical scholarship, but they do not tell the whole story because an additional source of explanation for scientific activism after the war has been overlooked. In their search for a way to end war, nuclear pacifists, whose membership came to include atomic scientists after World War II, "veered away from the path trodden by most traditional pacifists; instead, they found the means to world peace in the quest for world government." The idea of a world community has been written about since the twelfth century and has been a persistent theme in the literature of the peace movement.8

Historians of the American peace movement have argued that atomic scientists joined forces with such traditional social reformers as women, intellectuals, clergy and college students to push for a literal re-formation of the international social structure so that war would no longer be possible. Einstein had been actively involved in pacifist causes since 1914. He used the Emergency Committee, the most militant faction of the broader atomic scientists' movement, to build an important source of prestigious support for the American peace movement after World War II.9

The debate over how best to achieve the international control of atomic energy and to put an end to war occurred in a world that did not yet have a government structure equipped for such a responsibility. The debate began and ended in a political era that was

---

The International Race for Nuclear Supremacy. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980.

8 Wittner, p. 134.

9 Ibid., pp. 165-166.

dominated by national security concerns. The pre-eminence of security concerns created problems for the peace movement generally and for the reformers who called themselves nuclear pacifists:10

> With the United States suddenly vulnerable to external attack and even annihilation, national leaders strove to achieve complete security through military preparedness in a world of hostile powers and revolutionary ferment. And, as interest in military-based security increased, citizen peace-seekers who emphasized nonmilitary cooperation toward a more just world order appeared as threats in the American way of peace. Private peace-seeking in the national security state seemed not only a dispensable reform; it came also to be viewed as subversive.

A growing fear of Soviet Communism; intensification of the Cold War, and Congressional scrutiny of scientists as security risks all served to dampen the enthusiasm of scientist-activists by 1948. Wittner notes that the outbreak of war in Korea dealt a "final hammerblow to the fragile postwar peace movement."11

It is in this historical context that ECAS scientists in August 1946 organized and funded a reform-based public communication campaign. And, although the announced goal at the time of incorporation was to raise funds to educate the public about atomic energy, a thematic analysis of the Committee's campaign literature and mass media publicity statements indicate that the goal actually was to reform "the hearts and minds of men."12

---

10 DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform, p. 138.

11 Wittner, p. 201.

12 Albert Einstein, "The Real Problem Is in the Hearts of Men," The New York Times Magazine, June 23, 1946, pp. 7, 42-44.

Paisley argues that reform is a unifying principle of public communication campaigns. It is clear that the ECAS campaign was fueled by what Paisley labels a genre of journalism called noncommercial advertising or publicity, here defined as the making public of ideas and issues and publicized as editorial not advertising content. Paisley also argues that public communication campaigns can be defined in terms of either their intent or their process. The thematic analysis shows that the ECAS members intended reform as their goal.13

For the ECAS, publicity served a dual purpose. Publicity created the emotional climate necessary for fund-raising; in tandem, it also served as a vehicle for outlining the kind of reform necessary to achieve world control of atomic energy. In the latter sense, publicity served as an instrument of reform because the ECAS attempted to engineer sufficient public pressure to achieve international control of atomic energy by a world government structure. Conscious and controlled use of publicity was a means to that end.

Before its formal incorporation in August 1946, several members of what would become the ECAS, including Einstein, Leo Szilard and Harold C. Urey, helped raise funds for the Federation of American Scientists' campaign for civilian control of atomic energy in the spring and summer of 1946. The success of that campaign encouraged atomic scientists to proceed with their second goal, which was the international control of atomic energy. The FAS orginated as a group of atomic scientists whose common bond was the Manhattan Project. The

---

13 William J. Paisley, "Public Communication Campaigns: The American Experience," in Public Communication Campaigns, eds., Ronald E. Rice and William J. Paisley, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981.

original group, the Federation of Atomic Scientists, expanded and changed its name in early 1946 to reflect its recruitment of a broader group of American scientists.

The ECAS funneled money to several organizations working for international control. It gave money to the National Committee on Atomic Information (NCAI), "a clearing house for 60 national church, business, labor, civic, farm, and women's organizations with 40,000,000 members." The ECAS also substantially funded the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the "voice of science," and the Association of Scientists for Atomic Education, the education arm of the Federation of American Scientists. The FAS could not receive money from a tax-exempt group such as the ECAS because the FAS had engaged in Congressional lobbying on the civilian control issue.14

Einstein, along with Harold C. Urey and E.U. Condon, wrote most of the mass media articles connected with the ECAS's public communication campaign between 1946 and 1951, although the Committee was most active between 1946 and 1948. After 1948 the Committee was in an inactive phase because of disagreement about its mission. The ECAS formally disbanded in 1951 because of divisions within the Committee and with the Federation of American Scientists over how best to achieve international control of atomic energy. Continued advocacy of the world government solution was considerd too controversial.15

---

14 Einstein letter to donors thanking them for contributions, ECAS papers, no date, Box 5, F. 9.

15 Oram to Einstein, May 27, 1947, ECAS papers, Box 5, F.8; Einstein to "Dear Friend of the Emergency Committee," May 20, 1948, Box 5, F.9.

Most Committee members wrote at least one article during the Committee's five-year existence. The Committee started with a core of five, but over the years gained and lost scientists as they became involved in other interests. By 1951, 15 different scientists had been members of the Committee. Of the ECAS scientists, five were Nobel Prize winners, although only three of the five, Einstein, Urey and Hermann Joseph Muller, had the Nobel at the time of the campaign. Linus Pauling received his in 1954 and Hans Bethe in 1967. Almost half of the ECAS scientists were physicists and had participated in the Manhattan Project.16

The original objectives of the ECAS were to:17

> advance the use of atomic energy in ways beneficial to mankind; to diffuse knowledge and information about atomic energy and to promote the general understanding of its consequences to society and to the people of the United States of America in order that an informed citizenry may intelligently determine its policy and shape its action to serve its own and mankind's best interests.

The Committee also stated a principal aim to be the solicitation of funds and presentation of grants-in-aid to accomplish the foregoing purposes.18

---

16 World's Who's Who in Science from Antiquity to the Present, Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, Inc., 1968.

17 "Certificate of Incorporation," ECAS papers, Box 1, F.2.

18 Ibid.

Thematic Analysis

The content of the appeal letters was characterized by themes of crisis, death and destruction unless nationalistic attitudes were subverted and a world government established.

The first of the appeals by Einstein and the ECAS was publicized in The New York Times on May 25, 1946, five months after Urey told America it should be "frightened for its life."25 The ECAS appeal contained the crisis theme that was to predominate in all appeal letters; it also contained another predominant theme -- that a new type of thinking was necessary if civilization were to survive in the atomic age:19

> Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing power to make great decisions for good or evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.
>
> We scientists who released this immense power have an overwhelming responsibility in this world life-and-death struggle to harness the atom for the benefit of mankind and not for humanity's destruction.
>
> Bethe, Condon, Szilard, Urey and the Federation of American Scientists join me in this appeal, and beg you to support our efforts to bring realization to America that mankind's destiny is being decided today -- now -- this moment.
>
> We need two hundred thousand dollars at once for a nation-wide campaign to let the people know that a new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move toward higher levels.

This telegram appeal for $200,000 was sent to "several hundred prominent Americans." Although the ECAS archival material does not include the mailing list used, an Oram memo on the results of the

---

19 "Atomic Education Urged by Einstein," The New York Times, p. 13.

telegram appeal indicates that the target of the appeal must have been wealthy and/or prominent individuals. The memo contains excerpts from donors capable of giving at least $100, and in many cases $500 in response to Einstein's first public appeal.20

An appeal letter that went out June 15, 1946 indicates that $60,000 was raised in response to the May telegram appeal. It also indicates that a more extensive mailing list was being developed by asking recipients of the May telegram appeal to suggest friends who might also donate. Fifteen months later, after 355,000 appeal letters had been sent and 800,000 pieces of campaign literature, $322,000 had been raised. Oram noted that the distribution costs "more than paid for itself" and did not exceed $50,000.21

A second media appeal for $1 million was publicized on Nov. 18, 1946 in The New York Times. This time the Committee released "six simple statements" that it wanted the public to know:22

**Atomic bombs can now be made cheaply and in large number. They will become more destructive.
**There is no military defense against atomic bombs and none is to be expected.
**Other nations can rediscover our secret processes by themselves.
**Preparedness against atomic war is futile, and if attempted, will ruin the structure of our social order.
**If war breaks out, atomic bombs will be used, and they will surely destroy our civilization.

---

20 "Excerpts from Letters Received in Answer to Dr. Einstein's Telegram of May 23 [1946]," ECAS papers, Box 5, F.7.

21 Einstein to "Dear Mr. and Mrs. Spiegel," June 15, 1946, ECAS papers, Box 5, F.9; Oram to ECAS, "Memorandum on the Campaign of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists," no date, Box 5, F.8.

22 "Atom Bombs Held Cheap, Plentiful," The New York Times, Nov. 18, 1946, p. 25.

**There is no solution to this problem except international control of atomic energy and, ultimately, the elimination of war.

Several of the six statements were included within the text of an appeal letter sent out at the time of the $1 million fund drive:23

> Through the release of atomic energy, our generation has brought into the world the most revolutionary force since prehistoric man's discovery of fire. This basic power of the universe cannot be fitted into the outmoded concept of narrow nationalisms. For there is no secret and there is no defense; there is no possibility of control except through the aroused understanding and insistence of the peoples of the world.

Thereafter, the six statements were incorporated into the campaign literature on a separate page, which included the donation request form. (See Appendix I) In addition to the six statement fact sheet, a typical mailing included a reprint of a mass media article written by a prominent person connected with the campaign, such as Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, or by an ECAS member.24

For example, a Jan. 20, 1947 mailing included an appeal letter, the fact sheet, and reprints of Einstein's article "Only Then Shall We Find Courage" from The New York Times Magazine and of Christian Gauss's American Scholar article, "Is Einstein Right?" combined in pamphlet form.35 Gauss was dean of Princeton College. On the back of the pamphlet there also was a reprint of a Louisville Courier-Journal editorial in support of the ECAS campaign.25

---

23 Einstein to "Dear Friend," ECAS papers, no date, Box 5, F.5.

24 "A Statement by the ECAS," no date, ECAS papers. Box 5, F.2.

25 "Only Then Shall We Find Courage," pamphlet, ECAS papers. Box 5, F. 2.

Other examples of campaign literature included Norman Cousins' "Don't Give Up on the Human Race," reprinted from the Saturday Review, Aug. 7, 1948; Einstein and Urey's "The Last Hour Before Midnight," which was the text of a June 30, 1947 press conference statement; Einstein's "A Reply to the Soviet Scientists," reprinted from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1948. (See Appendix II for a list of campaign literature distributed.) Additionally, Einstein, Urey and Szilard made radio addresses and trustees spoke on behalf of the ECAS to groups in Princeton, Chicago, Cincinnati, Louisville, Portland, Oregon and San Francisco. Personal conferences with individuals were held in New York by several of the trustees, and in Princeton by Einstein.26

None of the appeal letters and only a few of the mass media publicity articles addressed the beneficial uses of atomic energy or how it worked. Instead, the focus was almost exclusively on the international consequences of atomic energy and the threat of war. The solution offered in the ECAS campaign literature was a "reordering of world institutions." The reordering was to be in the form of a world government that would control atomic energy, administer its use and provide an international security force to keep the peace.

The type of appeal that predominated, as assessed in terms of McGuire's taxonomy of appeal types, was a pathos appeal based on fear. According to McGuire, pathos is characterized by an appeal to feelings, values, and emotions. It argues for a given belief by

---

26 Oram to Einstein, "Memorandum on the Campaign of the ECAS, p. 2. ECAS papers, Box 5, F.8.

pointing out the desirability of consequents that would follow from the given belief. (See Appendix 3 for pathos appeal based on fear).27

As the campaign entered its second and third years, the appeal letters became increasingly foreboding. For example, the first paragraph of a Nov. 25, 1947 appeal letter started this way: "I write to you out of a feeling of grave concern, which I believe you share. I am convinced that if the present bitterness continues to dominate international relations we face catastrophe." By Sept. 17, 1948, the tone is increasingly morose:28

> Today every citizen lives in desperate peril. It is not only his own life which is menaced and that of his loved ones. We see the twilight deepening over our great civilization. ... The nations are adrift upon a familiar sea whose only termination throughout history has been the catastrophe of war.

The increasingly fearful tone of the letters coincided with an increasingly dire state of financial affairs for the Committee. Fund-raising memos and financial statements indicate a sharp drop-off of funds in the second half of 1947 and fundamental disagreement about what the mission was: "The Committee," Oram said, is faced by a subjective problem and not an objective one. It is the problem of reaching basic agreements within the Committee as to what its position is and how the position is to be translated in terms of effective education. If these were clarified, there would be no lack of public support." Oram also noted in a separate letter to Einstein that the

---

27 McGuire, p. 201.

28 Einstein to "Dear Friend," Nov. 25, 1947, ECAS papers, Box 5, F.9; Einstein to "Dear Friend," Sept. 17, 1948, Box 5, F.9.

Committee was still taking in money at the rate of $25,000 to $30,000 per month "on the basis of a position made public eight months ago and with the help of your interview in the 'New York Times' published almost a year ago."29

There was disagreement both within the ECAS and with the National Committee on Atomic Information and the Association of Scientists for Atomic Education. There also was disagreement with the Federation of American Scientists. The fundamental disagreement was over how best to approach the international control of atomic energy: Should the United Nations be given continued support or should a world government structure separate from the U.N. be supported? The FAS stood solidly behind the U.N., while the ECAS pushed for creation of a separate world government.30

These disagreements led to a curtailment of ECAS fund-raising activities. A May 20, 1949 letter to friends of the Emergency Committee stated:31

> Perhaps the most important issue raised by the advent of atomic energy is that of the establishment of international control. Today it is evident that this issue is not capable of a solution except within the framework of a general settlement of most of the other outstanding postwar issues. Any fruitful

---

29 Schaffner to McDonald, May 27, 1947, ECAS papers, Box 4, F.5; Oram to Einstein, May 27, 1947, Box 5, F.8; Oram to Einstein, May 27, 1947, Box 2, F.1.

30 Fry to Szilard, Oct. 28, 1947, ECAS papers, Box 5, F.8; Association of Scientists for Atomic Education, Inc., "Recommendations of the Educational Planning Committee," p. 6, Box 3, F. 28; Rush (FAS administrative committee) to ECAS, July 17, 1947, Box 16, F.3.

31 Einstein to "Dear Friend of the Emergency Committee," May 20, 1949, ECAS papers, Box 5, F.9.

> discussion of it will, therefore, involve taking a stand on political questions which, of necessity, must be of a controversial nature. The Emergency Committee does not consider it its task to deal with controversial issues, and we have therefore decided to curtail our activities.

The ECAS had been involved in controversial activities all along: it had advocated world government from the beginning. Its advocacy of world government was most apparent in the articles written by Committee members and Committee sympathizers in mass media magazines. These articles were well written, with explicit, forcefully argued conclusions. Crisis, and fear of civilization's destruction were again predominant themes, but also predominant was the theme that world government was the only way to resolve the crisis occasioned by the release of atomic energy. A second major theme was the argument that faith in reason, and in the scientists who understood the socio-political perils of atomic energy best, would bring a resolution to the crisis.

PUBLICITY ARTICLES

Between 1946 and 1951, ECAS members and their sympathizers wrote 45 media articles. Of the 45, Urey, Einstein, and Condon wrote half (51%) of them. For this reason, the content of their articles will be reported on extensively.

Urey was one of the most active writers on the ECAS. He had begun speaking out about the atom's effect on humanity as early as October 1945, approximately two months after the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Science magazine reprinted Urey's address at an October 1945 luncheon commemorating the birthday of Alfred Nobel.

In this address, Urey mentioned at least once each of the six statements of fact that the ECAS would later adopt in its campaign literature. He noted that the countries of the world "...shall live in constant fear of sudden and violent death. A world of vast fear and apprehension will be our lot and that of our children." He hoped that the bomb would be viewed as "sufficiently terrible to make possible the bringing of peace to the earth." He argued that the only way out was to have "a superior world government of some kind possessing adequate power to maintain the peace."32

Urey used the fear appeal extensively in his mass media messages. In an address to The Nation's three-day forum on "The Challenge of the Atomic Bomb" in December 1945, Urey was explicit about the appeal's usefulness:33

> We need, first of all, to be thoroughly frightened. Of course, fright that leads to hysteria doesn't do us much good, but if we can channel a real good fright into the direction of constructive effort, great benefit may come from it.

In Collier's, Urey wrote: "We will eat fear, sleep fear, live in fear, and die in fear. ...Atomic war could unleash forces of evil so strong no power of good could stop them. Make no mistake. Other civilizations have died because they would not learn their lessons in time." Urey's warning received coverage in other mass media magazines, such as The United States News. The article noted that Urey had written numerous articles and made many speeches "on the necessity of

---

32 Urey, "The Atom and Humanity," Science, Vol. 102, Nov. 2, 1945, p. 437, 439.

33 Urey, "The Task Before Us," The Nation, Vol. 161, Dec. 22, 1945, p. 719.

controlling the manufacture of the bomb internationally, and keeping it out of the hands of the military at home, lest its development be directed to warlike purposes."34

The New Yorker described Urey as a "prime exemplar of this scientist-into-spokesman trend." It quoted Urey as saying, "I've dropped everything to try to carry the messge of the bomb's power to the people because if we can't control this thing, there won't be any science worthy of the name in the future. I know [emphasis in the original] the bomb can destroy everything we hold valuable and I get a sense of fear that disturbs me in my work. I feel better if I try to do something about it."35

Urey used a pathos appeal based on fear in the mass media and a logos (rational) approach in specialized journals such as Foreign Policy Reports, Congressional Digest and United Nations World. McGuire defines the logos appeal as one that argues for the truth of a given belief by presenting evidence in favor of the probable truth of premises from which the given belief follows. This is distinguished from the pathos appeal, which argues for a given belief by pointing out the desirability of consequents that would follow from the given belief.36

---

34 Urey, "I'm A Frightened Man," Collier's, p. 51; "A Scientist's warning," The United States News, Vol. 21, Aug. 30, 1946, p. 52.

35 "The Talk of the Town," The New Yorker, Vol. 21, Dec. 15, 1945, p. 23.

36 McGuire, p. 202.

Typically, in the specialized media journals, Urey presented his case for world government, and he argued that this government should be distinct from the United Nations:37

> To state what the United Nations is not is to state in a negative way what a world government should be. But in order to be clear, let us repeat this. A world government must have a certain limited sovereignty, and in this region of activities it makes the final decision from which there is no appeal. Then it must have some properly constituted organization that can make laws, an executive body that can enforce them, and courts that can make decisions when laws are violated.

Urey's media messages were characterized by emotional appeals in large circulation magazines and rational appeals in special circulation vehicles. His messages were overwhelmingly characterized by explicitly drawn conclusions and repetition of basic themes of fear and crisis. Urey did much to publicize the ECAS's six simple statements of fact, particularly the sixth fact: There is no solution to the problem except international control of atomic energy. He did little to foster the ECAS's original goal of diffusing information about atomic energy as a physical process and about its beneficial uses.

Einstein also used an emotional appeal based on fear, although the fear appeal was considerably less intense, to draw attention to the crisis engendered by atomic energy, and like Urey, he vigorously promoted the world government cause. Also like Urey, Einstein did little to educate the public about atomic energy in non-political

---

37 Urey, Congressional Digest, Vol. 27, August 1948, p. 204. See also Urey's two-part series, "The Case for World Government," The Christian Century, Vol. 66, June 29, 1949, pp. 785-86 and July 6, 1949, pp. 818-820.

terms, although he did write a popular explanation of his mass-energy equivalence formula in 1946 in Science Illustrated.38

From the beginning Einstein's mass media articles focused on the virtues of world government, and although Einstein stated that he did not believe that civilization would be wiped out in a war fought with the atomic bomb, he thought the bomb was a menace. "Perhaps it is well that it should be. It may intimidate the human race into bringing order into its international affairs, which, without the pressure of fear, it would not do."39

In The New York Times Magazine in June 1946, Einstein reinforced the no defense, no secrets arguments about the bomb. He explained how men could move beyond nationalism toward supra-nationalism. The best way to do this, according to Einstein, was to be "generous in giving to the world the knowledge we have of the forces of nature, after establishing safeguards against abuse."40

By 1947, Einstein had grown impatient about the pace of negotiations for international control of atomic energy. Writing again in The Atlantic Monthly, Einstein said, "The public, having been warned of the horrible nature of atomic warfare, has done nothing about it, and to a large extent has dismissed the warning from its consciousness." He had become convinced that logic alone would not

---

38 Einstein, Science Illustrated, Vol. 1, April 1946, pp. 16-17.

39 Einstein, as told to Raymond Gram Swing, "Einstein on the Atomic Bomb," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 176, November 1945, p. 45.

40 Einstein, in an interview with Michael Amrine, "The Real Problem Is in the Hearts of Men," The New York Times Magazine, June 23, 1946, p. 44.

suffice to arouse the American people: "There must be added that deep power of emotion which is a basic ingredient of religion."41

Einstein never failed to mention world government as the most appropriate solution to the atomic crisis. He made excellent use of repetition and drew explicit conclusions. The tone of his articles was urgent, and the crisis theme was present, as in Urey's writing, but Einstein focused as well on analyzing the root causes of the public's behavior and concluded that a new type of thinking was essential to survival and for movement toward higher levels of reasoning.42

In contrast, Condon who resigned shortly after the Committee's first meeting because he was director of the Bureau of Standards and did not want to have his ECAS membership perceived as a conflict of interest, did not focus exclusively on atomic energy issues. Instead, he wrote extensively about the impact of science on society and argued repeatedly for relief from restrictions on scientific inquiry.

Though he was associated with the ECAS for only a short time, Condon helped to reinforce the ECAS message that atomic weapons would become more destructive and that there could be no secrets in science. He argued that support should be given to world cooperation in the form of the United Nations and other similar organizations. His goal also was to explain what science was, how it worked and the problems to which it could be applied. Condon feared that scientists were

---

41 Einstein, as told to Raymond Swing, "Atomic War or Peace," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 180, November 1947, p. 29, 32.

42 "Atomic Education Urged by Einstein," The New York Times, May 25, 1946, p. 13.

misunderstood and that science, in the afterglow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had gotten a bad name.43

He exalted science:44

> There is in scientific research a spiritual growth in man as great as any which can be derived from a formal act of worship carried on in the world's greatest cathedrals. It is here that the greatest value for mankind lies, and it is here that science is today most poorly understood.

He argued that science and scientists were not responsible for the destructive applications based on scientific developments. He argued also that the scientific method should be applied to solving social problems instead of being made the scapegoat for human evil. Condon alone of the ECAS members talked about the potential of atomic energy for peace-time use.45

Condon's writing was characterized exclusively by a logos appeal. He drew explicit conclusions and ignored opposition arguments most of the time. Condon did not make use of repetition as much as Urey and Einstein did, and the themes of crisis, death and destruction were largely absent.

---

43 E.U. Condon, "Science and Our Future," Science, Vol. 103, p. 416; "The Attack on the Intellect," The Nation, Vol. 170, March 25, 1950, p. 267; "Contemporary Science," New Republic, Vol. 122, Feb. 13, 1950, pp. 11-15; "Science and the National Welfare," Science, Vol. 107, Jan. 2, 1948, pp. 2-7; "Science and Security," Science, Vol. 107, June 25, 1948, pp. 659-665.

44 Condon, "Science, Secrecy, Security," Harper's, Vol. 200, February 1950, p. 59.

45 Condon, "The Potential of Atomic Energy for Peace-time Use: Atoms at Work," The Nation, Vol. 170, May 20, 1950, p. 495.

Condon's media articles never advocated a world government solution. He talked about atomic energy issues within the larger context of the problems of science. His primary thrust was to defend science, both its method and its practitioners. And, though these were not the original objectives of the Emergency Committee, Condon's approach provided a valuable broadening of issue discussion.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Sixty-eight percent of the mass media publicity articles written by ECAS members, including those not written by Urey, Einstein and Condon, dealt with atomic energy. Of these, the overwhelming majority of the articles focused on the social, political and international implications of atomic energy. The other 32 percent dealt primarily with issues in science, such as elimination of secrecy restrictions. Interestingly, 37 percent of the ECAS publicity articles did not mention any of the six statements that the Committee said it wantec the public to know. This omission was a wasted opportunity.

The ECAS' public communication campaign was a limited success. Its chairman, Albert Einstein, was a visible and respected person in the United States. He ranked within the top ten of Gallup's list of respected men in 1948, 1951 and 1953. He helped bring in more than $500,000 for the ECAS in two years. However, this fell far short of the $1 million goal. In terms of other fund-raising efforts at the time, Oram noted that the ECAS had raised substantially more than other similar groups with which he was familiar in 1946, such as the United World Federalists ($200,000), the American Association for the

United Nations ($200,000), the Foreign Policy Association ($230,000) and the American Civil Liberties Union ($65,000).46

However, Cutlip's history of fund raising in the United States indicates that organizations like the Red Cross were raising millions on an annual basis throughout World War II and after. Of course, the Red Cross was organized for a different reason. It was larger and more firmly entrenched; however, Cutlip's history indicates that with the right appeal and the right cause there were substantial funds to be raised during the war and after.47

The ECAS probably should have been able to raise more money. Even before the ECAS began its public communication campaign, an aware public on the subject of world government existed. Gallup poll data from March 1945 indicates that 81 percent of respondents agreed that the United States should join a world organization with police power to maintain world peace and 83 percent thought it was very important to join such a world organization. In 1946, 54 percent said the United Nations should be strengthened to make it a world government with power to control the armed forces of all nations, including the United States. These kinds of poll inquiries were not repeated in subsequent years, but the poll data reported above does indicate that public

---

46 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-71, Vols. 1,2, New York: Random House, 1972. Survey No. 433-K, Question 9, Nov. 26-Dec. 1, 1948, Survey No. 483-TPS, Question 6, Dec. 9-14, 1951; Survey No. 509-K, Question 5a, Dec. 6-11, 1952; Oram to Einstein, Urey and trustees, May 20, 1948, ECAS papers, Box 5, F.8; Oram to Schaffner, May 24, 1947, Box 1, F. 13.

47 Scott M. Cutlip, Fund Raising in the United States: Its Role in America's Philanthropy, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965, pp. 413-422 and 477-78.

sentiment for a U.N.-type world government was present even before the ECAS campaign got underway.48

Though there was favorable public sentiment toward a world government structure like the United Nations, 61 percent of Gallup respondents thought that the United States should use the atom bomb in another world war when questioned in 1950, four years after the ECAS campaign had begun. This kind of attitude was something the ECAS had struggled long and hard to counteract. This was difficult to do, given the fact that the American public named the atom bomb as one of the greatest inventions ever, second only to the electric light and electrical appliances.49

Additional Gallup poll data indicates that another three of the ECAS' main messages -- civilization will be destroyed in another world war; there is no defense against the bomb; there is no secret -- apparently failed to make a discernible impact, using the Gallup poll data as an imperfect measure.

For example, acceptance of the "there is no secret" message was mixed. Seventy-one percent of Gallup respondents were unwilling to give "the secret" to the United Nations Security Council, or to England (72 percent), but 65 percent thought that other nations would develop the bomb while only 22 percent thought the United States could keep "the secret."50

---

48 Gallup Survey Vol. 1, No. 343-K, Question 6a, March 22-27, 1945, p. 497; Survey No. 375-K, Question 2, July 26-31, 1946, p. 592.

49 Gallup Survey Vol. 2, No. 458-K, Question 23, July 9-14, 1950, p. 929; Vol. 1, Survey No. 388-K, Question 13a, Jan. 17-22, 1947, p. 625.

The ECAS' "there is no defense" message failed. Sixty percent of respondents in October 1949, three years after the ECAS campaign had begun, said that scientists would be able to develop a defense against the bomb within the next 10 years. The ECAS' repeated warnings that another war would destroy civilization went unheeded. Sixty-seven percent of Gallup respondents disagreed that "if another world war comes it would mean an end to mankind."51

Although this study focused only on printed material, the ECAS' use of publicity techniques reached far beyond the print media. Radio was used by Einstein, Urey and Szilard. Luncheons in Princeton and New York, at which eminent ECAS scientists addressed the socio-political implications of atomic energy, provided opportunities for significant media coverage. The Committee also sponsored large scale conferences at Princeton and Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, again featuring eminent scientists who discussed the implications of atomic energy.52

Six members of the ECAS contributed a chapter to one of the earliest books on what the release of atomic energy meant for civilization. One World or None also was made into a film with the support of the Committee. Station WMCA in New York City helped popularize the ideas in One World via a 13-week series of public

---

50 Gallup, Vol. 1, Survey No. 357, Question 5a, Oct. 5-10, 1945, p. 536; Vol. 2, Survey No. 446-K, Question 16a, Aug. 14-19, 1949, p. 850; Vol. 1, Survey No. 357, Question 5d, Oct. 5-10, 1945, p. 536.

51 Gallup, Vol. 2, Survey No. 449-K, Question 4c, Oct. 30-Nov. 4, 1949, pp. 869-70; Vol. 2, Survey No. 455-TPS, Question 9, May 4-9, 1950, p. 919.

52 Oram to trustees, "Memorandum on the Campaign of the ECAS," p. 2, ECAS papers, Box 5, F.8.

service programs. Additionally, telegram and mail appeals were used, and Einstein often spoke by telephone hook-up to important conferences he could not attend because of health constraints.53

The ECAS made use of multiple media during its public communication campaign. It achieved widespread publicity, and it used that publicity as an instrument of reform. However, it was difficult to sustain a perpetual state of crisis and fear. This appeal worked to make the public aware that the release of atomic energy had frightful consequences, but beyond awareness the public was not moved to actively lobby in great numbers either Congress or government to press for international control of atomic energy.

International control of atomic energy was never achieved. The U.N. failure to ensure control prodded Einstein and the ECAS to try harder to sell the world government solution as the only viable policy option. Although the ECAS' reform goal was not achieved, its major source of controlled communication, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, still publishes today.54

Future research should focus on the Bulletin to contrast the content of the Committee's uncontrolled communication, examined in this study, with its controlled source of communication during the public communication campaign.

---

53 Oram to trustees, "Memorandum on Fund Raising Campaign of ECAS, Inc." Oct. 1, 1946-April 30, 1947, p. 2, ECAS papers. Box 4, F.6; "Summary of Recent Important Events," Jan. 17, 1947, p. 2, Box 1, F.7.

54 "A Policy for Survival: A Statement by the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, April 12, 1948," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 1948, pp. 176, 188.

The education efforts of the National Committee on Atomic Information and the Association of Scientists for Atomic Education, both of which the ECAS funded and collaborated with in education efforts, also should be examined for fidelity to the goals and purposes of the campaign. The two groups differed as to whether they should only give the atomic facts to the public or whether solutions for answering the threat of the bomb should be offered. The National Committee wanted nothing to do with solutions while the Association of Scientists thought the public ought to be made aware of solutions. They compromised by agreeing to present several solutions and not tie themselves to any particular solution. In contrast, the ECAS publicized only one acceptable solution -- world government distinct from the United Nations.55

Additional research also might focus more closely on the uses of publicity in other public communication campaigns. This paper argued that the ECAS used publicity as an instrument of reform to press for the international control of atomic energy in the form of a supra-national government. The thematic analysis indicates that reform was the intent of the ECAS public communication campaign. It also indicates that fear appeals were consistently employed to make the public aware of the great danger posed by the release of atomic energy and to encourage acceptance of the world government solution.

A campaign based on the use of publicity as an instrument of reform is difficult to categorize under Grunig's four models of public

---

55 Association of Scientists for Atomic Education, Inc., "Recommendation of the Educational Planning Committee," p. 6, ECAS papers, Box 3, F.28.

relations. The ECAS campaign was a one-way communication effort in that it never sought feedback from the targets of its campaign messages. This means that the ECAS campaign should fall under either Grunig's first or second model, which are one-way communciation processes. Grunig's first model equates publicity with press agentry, "getting attention in the media for [practitioners'] organizations or clients." The truth of the information is not important under the press agentry/publicity model. Grunig's second model describes the public information process, which is premised on the idea that facts can be disseminated dispassionately and the truth of the information is always important.56

It is important to understand that Grunig's models are based a Great Man approach to history that basically is confined to an examination of the ideas of Ivy Lee and Edward L. Bernays. Undoubtedly these two men had a substantial impact on the developing profession of public relations and are worth considerable time and scholarship. However, both Lee and Bernays were concerned almost exclusively with developing an adequate public relations process useful to the corporate world. Hence, the focus of public relations history on Bernays and Lee of necessity becomes a focus on the development of corporate public relations. Even revisionist historian Marvin Olasky's challenge to the evolutionary view of public relations still focuses on corporate relations and is, in essence, still a conversation with

---

56 James E. Grunig and Todd Hunt, Managing Public Relations, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1984, p. 22.

Lee and Bernays about the meaning and limits of the public relations process.57

Additionally, a focus on Lee and Bernays carries with it their struggle against the institution of journalism. The terms of the debate about what public relations has been and what it has become have been dictated, in large measure, by the media's defense of its right, and its right alone, to inform a democratic citizenry about public issues. Any encroachment by press agents, publicists, public relations experts, to bring attention to an issue that the press has not first defined as legitimately newsworthy constitutes "space grabbing," "image-making," and "a threat to the democratic process."58

The ECAS campaign fits neither of Grunig's one-way models. This should not be surprising, given the corporate focus of public relations history on which the models are based. An historical review of the ECAS campaign process and a thematic analysis of the campaign literature, however, do indicate that reform was the intent and publicity was used to that end. The use of publicity in the ECAS campaign was not a mere attention-getting device propagated through "incomplete, distorted, or half-true information." Neither was it the objective dissemination of information characterized by a public education effort. It was a reform effort in the great Progressive

---

57 Ibid., Chapter 2, pp. 13-46.

58 See Edward L. Bernays' Biography of an Idea. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965, p. 288, for a brief discussion of Editor and Publisher's attack on public relations. See also Susan Caucill's "A New Sense of Power: Albert Einstein and the Publicity Campaign for World Government," Chapter Two, unpublished PhD dissertation, College of Communications, University of Tennessee at Knoxville, 1989.

tradition of the muckrakers who saw evil and sought to excise it through the floodlight of publicity.59 The ECAS saw the evil of the atomic bomb and the threat of ever more destructive wars and sought to excise the evil by exposing nationalism as the root of the evil. But the ECAS went one step further than mere exposure, it offered what it called the only solution possible -- supra-national or world government. The ECAS campaigned strongly to make the voice of science heard on how the world should be organized in the aftermath of the release of atomic energy.

The uses of publicity are not well defined in the public relations literature. Analysis of the ECAS's public communication campaign raises the possibility that publicity is conceptually distinct from press agentry. It also raises the possibility that when publicity is used as an instrument of reform it is not a simple dissemination-of-information process either. A review of the ECAS campaign also suggests that Grunig's four models of public relations might be expanded to include a noncorporate focus, thus encompassing a broader range of public relations activities. If future research on public communication campaigns that have reform as the goal should substantiate these ideas, then perhaps Grunig's four models of public relations should be expanded to include a fifth model, in which

---

59 Eric F. Goldman contends that muckrakers "seized hold of the general Progressive awareness of publicity and discovered conscious, controlled publicity as a major instrument of modern America," in "Public Relations and the Progressive Surge: 1898-1917," Public Relations Review, Special Issue: Public Relations in American History, Vol. IV, No. 3:52-62 Fall 1978, p. 58.

publicity as an instrument of reform is treated as conceptually distinct from press agentry and public information.